Nuclear Weapons, the War Powers, and the Constitution: Mutually Assured Destruction?
By
By
John M.A. DiPippa[1]*
A screaming comes across the sky.
It has happened before but there is nothing to compare it to now.[2]**
In November 2017, a committee of Congress did something it had not done in over forty years: considered whether to limit the President’s power to unilaterally use nuclear weapons.[3] The committee hearing occurred amidst increasingly bellicose rhetoric between the United States and North Korea.[4] It followed the introduction earlier that year of bills to require a congressional declaration of war before the President authorized the first use of nuclear weapons.[5] In spite of this renewed interest in the grave dangers of nuclear Armageddon, the committee failed to reach an agreement on what, if anything, should be done.[6] Thus, the nuclear status quo remains unchanged: the President has unilateral authority to order the use of nuclear weapons.
The conventional wisdom about presidential power to make war vis-a-vis Congress posits that while the President may use military force to defend the nation, any offensive use of force requires congressional authorization.[7] Of course, the reality was never as simple as the conventional wisdom held. Presidents in the nineteenth century sometimes deployed the military prior to congressional action.[8] The notion of “defensive war” allowed presidents to take actions to defend the United States, its people, and its possessions outside of the country.[9] After World War II, however, defensive war took “a quantum jump, both conceptually and in practice.”[10] Post-World War II theory and practice drifted toward allowing the President more and more authority to “make war before Congress has had a chance to act.”[11] Our strategic commitments, our mutual defense obligations, and our far-flung military bases expanded the range of our nation’s protective cover.[12]
Nuclear weapons challenge this conventional thinking. The perfect storm of our changing understanding of the constitutional rules for making war and the imperatives of the nuclear age has conspired to blind us to constructive examination of the issue.[13] If the nation’s defense strategy policy contemplates a nuclear first strike capability or includes a nuclear first use option, then the conventional constitutional wisdom appears to have little meaning.[14] Because of this, presidential power to unilaterally employ nuclear weapons in an offensive context outside of retaliation for a sudden nuclear attack raises serious constitutional questions about the proper distribution of the power to make war.[15]
Building on this insight, this Article discusses the implications the original meaning of the proper constitutional distribution of the war power as it relates to the use of nuclear weapons. This Article aims to provide a framework to answer the question of the constitutionality of the use of nuclear weapons as the Framers might answer.
Part II discusses the relatively few legal scholars who address the constitutional issues relating to the use of nuclear weapons. In Part III, I will outline the development of the U.S. policies on using nuclear weapons. Part IV discusses the need for congressional involvement in nuclear decision making. Part V discusses what the historical sources tell us the Constitution’s Framers may have meant when they set out the Constitution’s war powers. In Part VI, I will use a contextual analysis borrowed from international law to develop the constitutional principles that should guide our consideration of these questions. Part VII discusses some proposals to limit or regulate unilateral presidential power. Finally, Part VIII concludes this Article.
Before the first atomic bomb exploded at the Trinity test site, Enrico Fermi took bets with some of his Manhattan Project colleagues on whether or not the explosion would ignite the atmosphere.[16] Fermi’s bet annoyed some of the men engaged in the bomb’s development.[17] Months earlier, the scientists had worked out the calculations and showed that an atmospheric conflagration would not occur.[18] Nevertheless, taking Fermi’s money was not a sure thing.[19] After all, the United States created the bomb in haste and under the pressure of war. Fears of a possible German development of an atomic weapon prompted the Manhattan Project.[20] Scientists developed the first atomic bombs in an extraordinarily short amount of time: the Manhattan Project received the go-ahead in 1942 and tested its creation on July 16, 1945.[21] One scientist apologized for a program that had “too frequently reduced to guesswork and empirical shortcuts.”[22] Moreover, the scientists working on the project constantly went beyond the limits of both practical and theoretical knowledge as each corresponding step toward completion of the weapon brought new and unexpected problems.[23] Finally, nothing like the new weapon had ever been tried before.[24] No government had ever lavished the amount of money on the development of a weapon like the United States did on the Manhattan Project.[25] Neither had any government ever tested such a device before. The actual, as opposed to the theoretical result, was unknown.[26]
Fermi’s macabre bet, and the uncertainty which generated it, illustrated the difficulty of thinking about nuclear weapons.[27] In 1945, no one really knew the precise effects of an atomic explosion. For example, the first atomic scientists greatly underestimated the amount of radiation released by nuclear fission (and later fusion).[28] Later, scientists also became aware of the electromagnetic pulse, a pulse of electricity that can disrupt and destroy the electrical systems of an entire continent.[29] Today scientists agree that large scale nuclear war would have a dramatic effect on the world’s climate.[30] They only disagree on how much of an effect it would have.[31]
Seen through this haze of uncertainty, Einstein’s purported dictum—to change our way of thinking[32]—becomes doubly difficult if we are not even sure what we are supposed to be thinking about. For most people, the weight of technical difficulty, the staggering proportions, and the inevitable uncertainty leads to simplistic conclusions. Either they conclude that if nuclear weapons are ever used again it will mean an immediate end of the world or they conclude that the effects of nuclear war won’t be as bad as predicted. As Leon Wieseltier has said, “If there is anything as foolish as not thinking about nuclear weapons, it is not thinking about them enough.”[33]
By and large, legal scholarship has not given nuclear weapons enough thought.[34] Shortly after World War II, William Borden, a lawyer, wrote one of the first strategic analyses of nuclear warfare.[35] Borden attacked the notion of mutual strategic deterrence.[36] He argued that war between world powers was inevitable[37] and that nuclear weapons would be used.[38] Because of this, the United States should prepare to fight and win a nuclear conflict.[39] He asserted that nuclear war could happen upon literally a moment’s notice and its outcome decided over the course of a few hours.[40] Therefore, the President should at all times have the great powers that are typically only reserved for during a declared war.[41] Borden believed the President must have the power to “order any war prosecuted to a successful conclusion, regardless of the cost.”[42] Indeed, as long as a vital minority of civilian defense workers remained loyal to the government, a nuclear war would not even need the support of the American people.[43]
Borden’s premises—that nuclear war will come in an instant and therefore the President must have the power to respond immediately—have structured what little debate there has been about the constitutional aspects of nuclear war. The presidential scholar, Edward Corwin, included discussion about nuclear weapons in his critique of the post-war Constitution.[44] In Total War and the Constitution, Corwin remarked that “if we take [the atomic bomb’s] menace with proper seriousness,” it will likely have “a considerable effect on both our industrial and our constitutional structure.”[45] He added:
[T]he effect will not be confined to wartime (wars waged with atomic bombs are likely to be over in a few hours) but will spread through peacetime. The effect of the impact of total war on the Constitution will thus become embedded in our peacetime Constitution.[46]
Although Corwin acknowledged the effect nuclear weapons might have on the structure of the government, his concern (at least initially) was the effect of this peacetime mobilization on individual rights.[47] In the end, he rejected the notion that atomic weapons made war “impossible.”[48] The atomic bomb, he noted wryly, “may have effectively prevented all future wars except the next one, but that is just the war that today has mankind so deeply, so justifiably troubled.”[49]
Corwin was not specific, however, about how to reconcile the nuclear age with constitutional structure. In other contexts, he voiced his fear of “presidential autocracy.”[50] He saw Congress, not the courts, as the remedy to this problem:[E]scape must be sought from ‘presidential autocracy’ by resort not to the judicial power, but to the legislative power—in other words, by resort to timely action by Congress and to procedures for the meeting of emergency situations so far as these can be intelligently anticipated.[51]
He argued for the creation of a joint congressional committee to supplant any individual committees and to receive all communications on nuclear policy.[52] In some unspecified way, this new committee would consult with the President and direct Congress take appropriate action. Presumably, these devices also applied to questions of nuclear strategy.
After Corwin, Raoul Berger was one of the first constitutional scholars to address the question of the application of constitutional norms to modern warfare.[53] Berger did not address nuclear war directly in his scholarship, however. Rather, he publicly endorsed the Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) proposal to rein in the President’s power through the creation of a consultation committee.[54] Berger supported the FAS proposal saying that “the authority ‘to repel attacks’ does not give the president any blanket authority to conduct war.”[55] It was “an extraordinary interpretation,” to say “that once we have been fired upon, Congress just becomes a wooden Indian” with “no further participation” in a war.[56]
Berger’s discussion is short like Corwin’s but for a different reason. Corwin was constrained by the lack of development. He acknowledged that his remarks on the subject were premature because “the strategy from the horrendous discovery has still to be elaborated.”[57] His remarks at that time were tentative and introductory because the technology was new. Berger, on the other hand, was constrained by more remote events. To him, the intent of the Framers as evidenced by the historical record guided all questions of constitutional interpretation.[58]
Berger advocated a return to the original constitutional distribution of powers.[59] Berger believed that “Congress, not the President, was given virtually plenary power to deal with all facets of war-making,” leaving the President only the power to repel sudden attacks on the U.S.[60]
Corwin disagreed with the notion that the Constitution “contained in embryo from the outset the entirety of constitutional law.”[61] Although this overstates Berger’s position, his fidelity to the Framers is the hallmark of his constitutional scholarship.[62] Nevertheless, they both agree that the President has the power to defend the country by retaliating against a sneak nuclear attack.
Neither Corwin nor Berger say very much about the relationship of constitutional war powers and nuclear warfare because their statements were part of larger works written against the background of more immediate and practical events.[63] Therefore, nuclear weapons were not the specific focus of their work. For Corwin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “aggrandizement” of power during World War II and its perpetuation thereafter obliterated what Corwin called the “constitutional law of peace.”[64] Berger wrote during the late Vietnam War era when Congress was either debating or had just enacted the War Powers Act.[65]
In contrast, Arthur S. Miller’s concern was nuclear war.[66] In 1982, Miller wrote that “[t]he time has come for lawyers to confront the question of whether nuclear weapons—their manufacture, deployment, and use—can be justified under constitutional or international law.”[67] Miller, quoting Einstein, declared that the time had come to “change our modes” of thinking about the constitutionality of nuclear weapons and sought in his work to do that.[68] Miller outlined five possible constitutional sources for his claim that nuclear weapons were unconstitutional: the Preamble,[69] the congressional war power,[70] the constitutional power to punish offenses,[71] and the integration of international law norms into the Constitution.[72] A fifth argument—that government has an affirmative duty to protect the citizens—springs from several sources, most importantly the Due Process Clause.[73]
Miller’s work is significant. It is the first piece of constitutional scholarship addressed to the problem of nuclear war. Its creativity stimulated thought on the problem. It is flawed, however. His argument concerning the Preamble illustrates the flaws found throughout his work.
Miller cannot settle on a position to take in regard to the Preamble. At first, he wants to give it substantive content.[74] Miller argued that the goals of the Preamble provided a starting point for more detailed analysis.[75] Nuclear weapons threaten these goals: to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessing of liberty on ourselves and on our posterity.[76] He concluded that “no one can argue that threatening the very existence of ‘posterity’ can be constitutional.”[77]
This seems to imply that once the substance was ascertained it could be enforced, but he is quick to qualify this statement: “The [P]reamble is not part of the Constitution,” he says “[i]t precedes it.”[78] It “sets the tone for the meaning to be given to the specific provisions” of the Constitution.[79] Yet this cannot be his argument, however. Many people can argue nuclear weapons very effectively advance the goals of the Preamble.[80] Indeed, the notion of mutual deterrence quite clearly provides for the common defense and protects posterity in a way that other conventional means cannot; it makes total war absolute and therefore unthinkable.[81] Miller’s argument from the Preamble does not advance his ultimate thesis unless the Preamble is given substantive content. Thus, we see Miller arguing essentially this syllogism: The Preamble requires the protection of posterity, and nuclear weapons will wipe out posterity, thereby rendering nuclear weapons as unconstitutional.[82]
Miller also feints in the direction of natural law. After again disclaiming that the Preamble has any enforceable content, he goes on to say that its goals implicate “a higher law than the Constitution.”[83] He asks somewhat rhetorically, “[C]an a principle of natural justice . . . be employed to determine the validity of nuclear weapons?”[84] He gives an unqualified affirmative answer.[85] His position is ripe with possibility. One wants to know the source of these great principles, their content, and their discernment. The structural implication of this natural law thesis raises many questions. Yet Miller leapfrogs the specifics of the argument: “Without going further into the complex question of natural justice, what particular provisions . . . are conceivably relevant to the nuclear weapons situation?”[86] Miller raises the issue of natural law, then abandons it. If the Preamble implicates natural law, then these implications need to be explored. If the Preamble does not implicate natural law, then raising it in connection with Miller’s argument concerning the Constitution makes little sense.
Finally, without natural law, one is left with the contradiction between Miller’s assertions of a contentless Preamble and a Preamble that affirmatively requires the protection of posterity. One searches in vain in the rest of the article for the resolution of this conflict.
Only when Miller reaches his fifth point—that the government has an affirmative duty to protect the people—does he return briefly to the Preamble.[87] Indeed, it’s not even clear that Miller keeps faith with his initial proposition that the Preamble sets the tone for the interpretation of the rest of the Constitution.[88] In short, Miller’s arguments turn constitutional law on its head. He seems to say that nuclear weapons are terrible; therefore, they must be unconstitutional.[89] If there is to be a legal condemnation of nuclear weapons, the Constitution, with its accumulated baggage of history, custom, and precedent must do so. It does not serve the cause of constitutional government to allow our fear of nuclear war to swallow the document. If we worry about the death of law through nuclear holocaust, we must not engage in a kind of symbolic nuclear destruction of the Constitution.[90]
Miller seems to recognize this.[91] The strongest (and longest) part of his article is a more or less conventional analysis of the war powers of Congress where he argues that Congress, not the President, has the exclusive power to make war.[92]
In their 1986 book, To Chain the Dog of War,[93] Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage devote a chapter to the question of the constitutional war power and nuclear weapons.[94] They argue that the Constitution gives Congress the war power “leaving the President only limited authority to act unilaterally in extraordinary situations.”[95] This division of power “reflects the
[F]ramers’ desire that deliberation and debate be brought to bear on any decision so momentous as to commit the nation to war.”[96] Unfortunately, nuclear war “seems to preclude the luxury of deliberation and debate, requiring instead secrecy and dispatch.”[97]
Although some conclude that nuclear war renders the Constitution’s division of power obsolete,[98] Wormuth and Firmage resist this temptation. Instead, they argue that the unique nature of nuclear war requires particular attention to the Constitution’s allocation of war making authority more than ever:
The [F]ramers’ judgment, inescapably value-laden was that, matters of war and peace—now writ large, in matters of extinction and survival—collective conscience, rather than individual whim, must prevail. If the [F]ramers were chary of permitting the President to wield muskets and sail ships surely we must pause to consider the wisdom of allowing our presidents to unilaterally control the vast nuclear arsenal.[99]
Nuclear weapons change the nature of warfare in several ways. First, they are qualitatively different from other weapons in their sheer destructive power.[100] Second, modern delivery systems are quick, accurate, and widely dispersed.[101] Third, there are tens of thousands of nuclear weapons dispersed among the (growing) handful of countries in the nuclear club.[102] Fourth, the devastation wrought by all out nuclear war is almost unimaginable.[103]
These changes to warfare dictate a return to the Framers’ approach to war making:
Surely the wisdom of the [F]ramers is unassailable: deliberation and debate are essential before this nation commits itself to those initial steps toward nuclear war that, once taken, may not be retraceable. Congressional powers over the conduct of foreign relations and, ultimately, the war power, must be invoked before the state becomes committed to a course of conduct that is deterministic and irreversible, a course that allows not alternative to nuclear war.[104]
Legal scholarship on the constitutional dimensions of nuclear war reached its zenith with the publication of First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the Constitution, Who Decides?[105] This collection of essays grew out of a symposium hosted by the Federation of American Scientists and the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control.[106] The topics ranged from presidential first use[107] to the allocation of constitutional power[108] to specific suggestions for implementing controls on the use of nuclear weapons.[109]
Jeremy Stone, whose essay was published in that collection, argued that the first use of nuclear weapons was unconstitutional.[110] Stone conceded that “few would question the right of a President to respond with nuclear weapons” to a nuclear attack but the first use of nuclear weapons “raises quite different questions.”[111] Unlike a sudden surprise nuclear attack, conventional wars are not won or lost in minutes.[112] Indeed, it would take several hours to release the tactical nuclear weapons to be used in the most likely scenario: an attack on a NATO ally.[113] This would give the President ample time to consult on the decision. He noted:
[S]etbacks in a conventional war overseas would not cost the United States its existence, its freedom, or its ability to pursue the conflict over time and in other ways, as America did in two world wars.[114]
Stone argued that the Constitution requires Congress to authorize offensive use of the military.[115] Using nuclear weapons to respond to a non-nuclear attack is so disproportionate that it constitutes “an entirely new war in common-sense terms.”[116] In legal terms, the first use of nuclear weapons without a declaration of war “would have gone from trying to ‘repel’ an attack on our forces and allies abroad to initiating just that kind of much wider commitment that the Founding Fathers wanted to be made by Congress.”[117]
Professor John Norton Moore disagreed with Stone. To Moore, it is:
[A] paradigm principle of American constitutional law that the President may conduct hostilities against an attacking nation, including in extremis making decisions to employ nuclear weapons in settings where, as here, Congress has not enacted any prohibition on such use.[118]
The more interesting (and real) constitutional question, according to Moore, was “the power of Congress to place policy limits on the exercise by the President of his power as Commander in Chief to conduct hostilities.”[119] Moore notes that the issue is unsettled and the sources ambiguous.[120] Indeed, the sources are circular.[121] Ultimately, Moore doubts that Congress can put any limits on the Commander in Chief power.[122] Even if the legal issue were resolved in favor of Congress, “its real world effect would be to reduce deterrence and crisis stability.”[123]
Robert Turner took a less measured approach in his essay. Turner argued that any limits on the President’s Commander in Chief power would be “flagrantly unconstitutional . . . and rather than promote peace, [it] would weaken our deterrent and make both conventional and nuclear war more likely.”[124] Turner asserted that the Framers vested the “supreme command” of the military in the President.[125] Congress could do nothing to limit or direct this command.[126] Impeachment was the only constitutional remedy for a President who wrongly started a war.[127]
Professor Stephen Carter adopted a position based both on the system of checks and balances, and the separation of powers. He argued that the President may use nuclear weapons to defend the country or its interests even in response to a conventional attack but that Congress may restrict the President’s ability to do so.[128] Carter said, “We cannot wish nuclear weapons away, and we cannot excise them through judicial fiat either.”[129] Even though a nuclear bomb “is a weapon of almost unimaginable destructive power,” that fact is “devoid of constitutional significance.”[130] This new crisis demands a wise political solution but Carter believed that:
[T]he urgent necessity for political solutions to the nuclear conundrum does not alter the meaning of the structural provisions establishing the system of balanced and separated powers. And under those provisions, unless Congress acts, the discretion to use or abuse all American armed forces rests with the President of the United States.[131]
According to Carter, we may not have much of country left standing after a full nuclear exchange, but we should not ignore the Constitution in pursuit of our security.[132]
By the late 1960s, the structure of United States nuclear policy had taken shape: the United States would launch a devastating nuclear attack on the Soviet Union if attacked with nuclear weapons and reserved the right to launch a nuclear attack if the Soviet Union attacked U.S. NATO allies.[133] This policy formed in the Cold War era when the Soviet Union, and its nuclear-armed ally China, were the primary adversaries to the United States and its nuclear-armed allies.[134]
Much prior scholarship proceeds from the assumption that nuclear war will occur quickly and end quickly, and that total destruction of at least the United States, if not the world, will result.[135] This perception arises from the doctrine of mutual assured destruction.[136]
This doctrine started quite early in the Post-Hiroshima era[137] and took shape in the Eisenhower Administration as a “massive retaliatory power,” positing that if nuclear weapons are used against the United States, the country will reply with such force as to assure the total destruction of the adversary.[138] Even then, however, the purely deterrent function of nuclear weapons became mixed with other, more aggressive uses. For example, in 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for the necessity of the “Super Bomb” (the Hydrogen Bomb) because they concluded:
[It was] necessary to have within the arsenal of the United States a weapon of the greatest capability, in this case the super bomb. Such a weapon would improve our defense in its broadest sense, as a potential offensive weapon, a possible deterrent to war, a potential retaliatory weapon, as well as a defensive weapon against enemy forces.[139]
A silent premise of this doctrine is that the United States will not be the first country to use its nuclear weapons.[140] The popular perception then was that a massive Soviet attack on U.S. cities and military installations would justify a similarly massive attack on the Soviet Union.[141]
The leading proponent of massive retaliation in the Eisenhower years, General Curtis LeMay, remarked that such an attack would leave the Soviet Union, a “burning, irradiating rubble.”[142] LeMay argued for targeting large military or industrial complexes within urban areas because even if the bombs
missed their precise targets, they would inflict what he called “bonus damage.”[143]
LeMay and others urged the United States to prepare for and wage “total war from the first hour of a conflict than allow it to drag on and consume more lives.”[144] Because they believed that is was impossible to defend the country from nuclear attack, they argued for the development of an arsenal of overwhelming strength and power designed to “kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy.”[145] Thus, LeMay established what he called his “Sunday Punch”: an assault strategy where the United States would develop overwhelming and redundant nuclear weaponry and launch most of its stockpile in its first attack.[146] This would leave the Soviet Union “a smoking, radiating ruin.”[147] LeMay could have said the same about the United States.
A significant number of nuclear strategists never accepted this notion, however.[148] They always maintained that nuclear strategy should not be geared to the all-out attack and response, the “wargasm” Herman Kahn called it.[149] Rather, United States nuclear policy must be geared to fight and to win a nuclear war.[150] Much of American nuclear production and deployment through 1974 was a response to the arguments for a war fighting capacity.[151]
This policy began to evolve as the Cold War thawed and the security environment changed.[152] The Soviet Union collapsed, China became more powerful and independent, more countries acquired nuclear weapons, and the threat of non-state terrorism loomed.[153] Even before then, however, nuclear strategists developed a war fighting alternative to mutually assured destruction. Paul Nitze, an influential strategic thinker, urged the adoption of a nuclear war posture that replicated the success of World War II’s air campaign in Europe.[154] Treating nuclear weapons as simply larger, more powerful conventional armaments, Nitze urged an initial focus on military targets to clear the way for the bombing of the enemy’s cities.[155] He dubbed this a “counterforce” strategy in opposition to LeMay’s “countervalue” strategy.”[156]
It was not until 1974, however, that war fighting became the official policy of this country when the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced the doctrine bearing his name.[157] The Schlesinger doctrine purported to give the President more nuclear options than simply destroying enemy cities.[158] Rather, Schlesinger claimed that the new plan consisted of a series of limited nuclear options which ranged from the destruction of a few missile sites, cities, or industries to counterforce warfare—full-scale strikes at Soviet military installations and the industries which support it.[159] Schlesinger also noted the ability to “implement response options that cause far less civilian damage”.[160]The Carter Administration perfected the Schlesinger doctrine in Presidential Directives NSC 50-59.[161] These documents went beyond both the notion of selectivity to victory and the plan for management of a protracted nuclear conflict.[162] They provided justifications for counterforce weapons as well as other measures designed to ensure that the United States would prevail in a nuclear war. Indeed, the old term counterforce was replaced by the word “countervailing” to signify the new approach.[163] Moreover, the directives provided for the use of nuclear weapons in support of ground troops who survive an earlier nuclear exchange.[164]
American nuclear policy since the announcement of the Schlesinger doctrine has followed its direction. Counterforce weapons system like the MX missile and the B-1 bomber; technical improvements like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and increased accuracy; and defensive measures like the Strategic Defense Initiative and civil defense plans were all part of the re-tooling of American nuclear doctrine from deterrence to war fighting.[165] The Reagan Administration never developed a new strategic doctrine. Rather, its policies suggested an endorsement of the war fighting notions enshrined in National Security Decision Memorandum 26.[166]
Beginning with the Clinton Administration,[167] presidents began to issue periodic Nuclear Posture Reviews.[168] The 1994 review kept deterrence as the centerpiece of nuclear strategy but suggested that nuclear forces be reduced to the minimum needed to maintain deterrence.[169] In 1996, however, the Clinton Administration suggested that the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical attack.[170] By 2002, the United States expressly added the deterrence of the use of weapons of mass destruction by nation states and terrorist organizations to its nuclear weapons policy.[171] These policies were “diplomatically disavowing the use of nuclear weapons except in extreme circumstances and yet, at the same time, hedging the disavowal to allow the greatest possible latitude for the use of nuclear weapons.”[172] In addition, the 2002 review articulated nuclear war fighting as a key component of the U.S. defense strategy.[173] As Joseph Gerson noted:
The Bush [A]dministration has again put nuclear weapons—and their various uses—at the center of U.S. military and foreign policy. The message of the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in December 2001 was unmistakable. As The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists editorialized, “Not since the resurgence of the Cold War in Ronald Reagan’s first term has U.S. defense strategy placed such an emphasis on nuclear weapons.” The NPR reiterated the U.S. commitment to first-strike nuclear war fighting. For the first time, seven nations were specifically named as primary nuclear targets: Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea. Consistent with calls by senior administration figures who spoke of their “bias in favor of things that might be usable,” the NPR urged funding for development of new and more usable nuclear weapons. This included a new “bunker buster.” Seventy times more powerful than the Hiroshima A-bomb, the bunker buster was designed to destroy enemy command bunkers and WMD (weapons of mass destruction) installations buried hundreds of feet beneath the surface.[174]
The Obama Administration’s nuclear strategy largely followed that of its predecessors even though it also pledged to abolish nuclear weapons.[175]
President Trump ordered a new Nuclear Posture Review as part of his Administration’s effort to “rebuild” the nation’s armed forces.[176] The Trump Administration’s goal was to “ensure that the United States nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats and reassure our allies.”[177]
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review pushes the country in a different direction from previous reviews.[178] Gone is the Obama Administration call for the abolition of nuclear weapons.[179] Instead, the Trump Administration argues that “it is not possible to delay modernization of our nuclear forces if we are to preserve a credible nuclear deterrent.”[180]
Flexibility is the cornerstone of the Trump Administration’s policy on the use of nuclear weapons.[181] The review notes that this flexibility will allow the President “to tailor the approach to deterring one or more potential adversaries in different circumstances.”[182] The Administration cites the increasing threat from a newly empowered Russia, the changing security landscape, and the latent threats from potential nuclear adversaries like Iran and North Korea.[183] This changing environment demands that United States policy be tailored to meet the known current threats and any unknown future threats.[184]
The review reaffirms traditional goals while at the same time expanding the possible circumstances in which nuclear weapons may be used. It reiterates traditional policies: to deter potential nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, provide security assurance to our allies and partners, to achieve us goals if deterrence fails, and provide a hedge against an uncertain future.[185] The primary goal of U.S. nuclear forces is to ensure that “potential adversaries do not miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear first use, either regionally or against the United States itself.”[186]
While the primary goal still is to deter potential nuclear adversaries from using nuclear weapons, the complex security environment demands that nuclear weapons play a role in other, complementary purposes.[187] The review notes that effective nuclear deterrence requires “nuclear-armed adversaries must recognize that their threats of nuclear escalation do not give them freedom to pursue non-nuclear aggression.”[188] A full range of nuclear capabilities is needed to create “the credible risk of intolerable consequences for the adversary.”[189]
The new posture moves well beyond the confines of mutually assured destruction in the event of a strategic nuclear attack.[190] Specifically, the review rejects a no first use pledge:To help preserve deterrence and the assurance of allies and partners, the United States gas never adopted a “no first use” policy and, given the contemporary threat environment, such a policy is not justified today. It remains the policy of the United States to retain some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response.[191]
In addition, the posture makes clear that the actions of non-state actors and non-nuclear aggression might lead to the first use of nuclear weapons. The Administration promised not to use nuclear weapons except in “extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.”[192] Extreme circumstance could include “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks,” including “attacks on the U.S., allied or partner civilization population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.”[193] The review expressly includes a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States or its allies as an extreme circumstance justifying the use of nuclear weapons.[194]
In addition, the review discusses the need to build up the U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal to deter current and future aggression.[195] In particular, the review notes that Russia’s capacity to and policy of threatening the first use of nuclear weapons to gain an advantage in regional conflicts seems premised on the calculation that the United States has neither the capacity nor the will to respond with nuclear weapons.[196] The review posits that, without a flexible and tailored nuclear policy, a nuclear state like Russia might gamble that the United States would not unleash a strategic response to their use of a tactical weapon.[197] This could lead to settlement of these conflicts on terms favorable to our adversaries.[198] Thus, the posture notes that the United States must ensure that Russia “does not miscalculate regarding the consequences of limited nuclear first use, either regionally or against the United States.”[199] Russian first use, regardless of scale, will “fundamentally alter the conflict, and trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow.”[200]
Any use of nuclear weapons would follow an unspecified “deliberative process.”[201] Still, the United States will keep “a portion of its nuclear forces on alert day-to-day, and retain the option of launching them promptly.”[202] According to the review, the missiles are not on “hair-trigger alert.”[203] Rather, the alert system is “highly stable” and “subject to multiple layers” of civilian and Presidential control.[204] Finally, the review notes:
All U.S. presidents since 1945 have considered U.S. employment of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances and for defensive purposes . . . [The use of nuclear weapons] would adhere to the law of armed conflict and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The United States will strive to end any conflict and restore deterrence at the lowest level of damage possible for the United States, allies, and partners, and minimize civilian damage to the extent possible consistent with achieving objectives.[205]
The changing security landscape and the consequent change in our nuclear strategy makes congressional involvement more necessary than ever. The most recent Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that the President can use nuclear weapons under an increasing number of circumstances.[206] Unlike the popular conception the United States will wait until the bombs are falling to deploy nuclear weapons, the posture makes clear that the President can use weapons even when the United States has not been attacked and even when those attacks are not nuclear.[207]
Congress delegated the authority to use nuclear weapons to the President in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.[208] In the process of setting up the Atomic Energy Commission, Congress said:
The President from time to time may direct the Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of . . . atomic weapons to the Department of Defense for such use as he deems necessary in the interests of national defense or (2) to authorize any atomic weapons . . . for military purposes.[209]
Mutually assured destruction may have held the few nuclear states at bay.[210] Neither side (and there were only two sides during the Cold War) would be willing to risk total destruction from strategic nuclear weapons.[211] As the members of the nuclear club grew, shifting alliances and national jealousies took the advantage from the United States.[212]
The security environment has become even more complex. The advent of tactical warheads, dirty bombs, and global terrorism, nuclear weapons greatly complicate the nuclear calculus.[213] The threat of nuclear terrorism made mutually assured destructions look even more anachronistic.[214] Nuclear weapons can now more easily be seen as “like other munitions.”[215] Nuclear war, at least of a limited nature, is now possible[216] and, indeed, contemplated by the U.S. national security policy.[217]
This vastly more complicated scenario requires that the status quo in regard to the use of nuclear weapons, especially their first use, be examined. The Framers’ vision of congressional primacy in war making is now so obscured as to be unrecognizable.[218] The current policy of the United States eliminates the Legislative branch from any role in deciding if and when the country goes to nuclear war.[219] At a minimum, we must restore some of the original constitutional balance between the Executive and Congress.[220] To explore this question, the following Sections will begin with the Framers’ understanding of the war making process and then apply those ideas in the context of nuclear strategy.[221]
To say that the Framers did not foresee nuclear weapons is to say very little.[222] The Framers did not anticipate television either, but courts have not hesitated to extend the First Amendment to the electronic media.[223] The critical issue is whether the principles the Framers placed in the Constitution have any application to the specific problems presented by nuclear weapons.[224]
Revolutionary era Americans feared executive power.[225] Edward Corwin, the noted presidential scholar, remarked “that ‘the executive magistracy’ was the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the natural friend of Liberty.”[226] Thus, the Articles of Confederation[227] did not provide for an Executive.[228] Congress retained both legislative and executive powers.[229] The first Executive officers were congressional creations.[230]
The arrangement did not work well. State legislatures did not prove to be “guardians of Liberty.”[231] Regional jealousies, state adventures in foreign affairs, and the general inefficiencies of the Articles led to “growing apprehension as the Congress found itself incapable of discharging its duties and responsibilities. Support began to grow for an independent executive.”[232]
Informed by these concerns, the delegates who gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 agreed on the need to create an executive department but little else about it.[233] This divergence of opinion meant that the Convention had to devote its attention to basic questions about the Executive: “[W]ould it be single or plural, act with or without a council, have veto power, how would it be chosen, for what term and with what possibility of re-election.”[234] Article II reflects this structural focus. The Convention rarely addressed issues of presidential power, either as to source or as to scope.
Several concerns motivated the Framers in their approach to the war powers of the proposed new government.[235] Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had the “sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war” as well as the power of “making rules for the government and regulation of the . . . land and naval forces, and for directing their operations.”[236] At the same time, the Articles gave Congress extensive control over the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal but reserved some authority for states to issue such after a congressional “declaration of war.”[237] The drafters of the Articles did not need to be precise with their terminology because in any event the only institution of government given any power under the Articles was the Congress.[238] More important was the power of Congress to direct the armed forces. Unlike the Constitution that splits the war declaring function from the war making function, the Articles joined these powers in one Congress.[239]
To a large extent, the creation of a powerful legislature reflected the colonists’ fear of executive control. As Edward Corwin put it, America was no longer a colony when it saw “the ‘executive magistracy’ as the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the natural friend of liberty.”[240] Post-revolution state constitutions reflected this fear which created legislatures with great powers and executives with narrow, tightly defined powers.[241] The state experience with powerful legislatures was not entirely satisfactory.[242] By 1787, the tyrannical excesses of the state assemblies had sobered the Framers on the wisdom of a single dominant branch of government.[243] In spite of the lingering suspicion of executive power and a lingering faith in elected assemblies, the Framers approached the Constitutional Convention more disposed toward executive power than before.[244]
Inefficiencies under the Articles bolstered this disposition further.[245] Even though Article 9 gave Congress “the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war . . . entering into treaties and alliances . . . of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace,”[246] each of these grants of power were limited by accompanying conditions on their exercise or their scope.[247]
Accordingly, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress found it increasingly difficult to conduct foreign affairs.[248] Article IX stated that:
The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque or reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war, to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same: nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day be determined, unless by the votes of the majority of the United States in Congress assembled.[249]
Requiring a supermajority allowed small states blocked action.[250] Ad hoc committees designed to conduct aspects of foreign affairs degenerated into regional bickering.[251] Individual states conducted their own foreign ventures.[252] Alexander Hamilton called it “a system so radically vicious and unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change in its leading features and characters.”[253]
From today’s perspective, we view the question of the war making power as an inter-branch matter.[254] We seek the answer in the entrails of the proper distribution of power between the President and Congress.[255] The Framers, however, saw the problem in Federalism terms: how to structure the federal government so it can effectively carry out the Union’s war and peace functions without entirely crushing state authority.[256] Thus, the little debate on the war powers of the federal government at the convention, thereafter, centered primarily on the power of the federal government versus the states, as opposed to the distribution of the war and peace powers among the several branches of the federal government.[257]
This concern was two-sided.[258] During the Confederation, the diplomatic activity of some individual states was a cause for concern.[259] As Edward Keynes put it, “he Articles of Confederation established an organization of thirteen states, but a fourteenth state, the United States, did not exist because the states retained their sovereignty.”[260] This led James Madison and Alexander Hamilton to raise the specter of disunity inviting foreign aggression.[261] George Washington noted:
I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation, without having lodged somewhere a power which will pervade the whole Union in as energetic a manner, as the authority of the different state governments extends over the several States. To be fearful of vesting Congress, constituted as that body is, with ample authorities for national purposes, appears to me the very climax of popular absurdity and madness. . . . Many are of opinion that Congress have too frequently made use of the suppliant humble tone of requisition, in applications to the States, when they had a right to assume their imperial dignity and command obedience. Be that as it may, requisitions are a perfect nihility, where thirteen sovereign, independent disunited States are in the habit of discussing [and] refusing compliance with them at their option. Requisitions are actually little better than a jest and a bye word through out the Land. If you tell the Legislatures they have violated the treaty of peace and invaded the prerogatives of the confederacy they will laugh in your face. . . . Things cannot go on in the same train forever.
It is much to be feared, as you observe, that the better kind of people being disgusted with the circumstances will have their minds prepared for any revolution whatever. We are apt to run from one extreme into another. To anticipate [and] prevent disastrous contingencies would be the part of wisdom [and] patriotism.[262]
At the same time, the Framers and their contemporaries generally feared a centralized government in possession of a standing army.[263] This concern for Federalism has largely vanished from modern consideration of the war and peace powers.[264] These concerns prompted the Framers assembled in Philadelphia in May 1787 to amend the Articles of Confederation.[265] Quickly, however, they re-defined their task from amendment to restructuring.[266]
They said little on war and peace issues until later in the summer.[267] The early comments show a fear of lodging unlimited war powers, peace powers, or both in the President.[268] During a debate about whether the executive should be one or several persons, Charles Pinckney, John Rutledge, and James Wilson expressed similar sentiments against giving the executive war and peace powers.[269] Pinckney feared that these powers would make the presidency “a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one,”[270] while Rutledge and Wilson expressed the less sanguine notion that the power of war and peace were “of a Legislative nature.”[271] Madison agreed with both Wilson’s delineation of executive and legislative powers and Pinckney’s characterization of an elected monarch, added that any powers given to the executive should be “confined and defined.”[272]
The Convention made little progress on the war, peace question until August.[273] At that time, the Convention dispatched the Committee of Detail to put the finishing touches on a draft constitution.[274] On August 6th, the Committee, through John Rutledge, reported to the Convention.[275] The Committee gave the Legislature the power “to make war.”[276] In addition, it gave the Legislature the powers:
To make rules concerning captures on land and water; [t]o declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas . . . and of offenses against the law of nations; [t]o subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application in any state, on the application of its legislature; . . . [t]o raise armies; [t]o build and equip fleets; [t]o call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions . . . .”[277]
The Committee also proposed creating an executive who “shall be [C]ommander in [C]hief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States.”[278]
The Convention considered each clause of the Constitution in turn.[279] On August 17, they reached the “make war” clause.[280] The question before the Convention was whether to substitute “declare” for “make.”[281] The debate was remarkably short; Madison’s notes on it take up barely more than a page and a half.[282]
Pinckney opposed giving the power to the whole Legislature.[283] Rather, he favored giving it to the Senate, “being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions.”[284] Pierce Butler responded that the Senate had the same infirmities as the whole Legislature.[285] “He was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the nation will support it.”[286]
None of the other delegates showed Butler’s faith in executive restraint.[287] Eldridge Gerry remarked that he never expected to hear in a republic “a motion to empower the Executive alone to make war.”[288] George Mason was “[against] giving the power of war to the Executive, because not (safely) to be trusted with it.”[289] Madison and Gerry moved to substitute “declare” for “make,” which left the Executive with the power to “repel sudden attacks.”[290]
Roger Sherman seemed to speak against the motion.[291] He favored leaving the language as it was because the proposed substitution narrowed what he saw as the already existing power of the President to “repel and not to commence war.”[292]
Oliver Ellsworth spoke of the difference between war and peace.[293] He wanted to make it easier to get into war than out of it because “[w]ar . . . is a simple and overt declaration [while] peace [is] attended with intricate & secret [negotiations].”[294]Mason spoke against the Ellsworth notion.[295] Mason was in favor of “clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace.”[296] He favored the substitution of “declare.”[297]
At this point, the Convention voted on the motion. Madison’s records diverge from the official journal.[298] Madison records one vote, initially seven for, two against, and one absent.[299] The journal, however, shows a vote four in favor and five against.[300] Madison noted that after his sole recorded vote, Rufus King remarked “that ‘make war’ might be understood to ‘conduct’ it which was an Executive function.”[301] King’s remark apparently satisfied any concerns Ellsworth had to the motion, as Madison says, “Mr. Ellsworth gave up his objection (and the vote of [Connecticut] was changed to—ay.)”[302]
The journal shows that a second vote on the motion was taken.[303] This time the vote was eight to one—the same tally as Madison’s second vote.[304] Some other maneuvering occurred.[305] Pinckney unsuccessfully tried to strike the entirety of the declare war clause.[306] Butler moved to give “the Legislature the power of peace, as they were to have that of war.”[307] Seconding the motion, Gerry noted that as few as eight senators could “exercise the power if vested in that body, and . . . may consequently give up part of the [United] States.”[308] In spite of these arguments, the motion failed to gain even one affirmative vote.[309] The Convention then adjourned for the day.[310] It did not return to the declaration clause.[311]
The literature on this debate is extensive but a fair consensus on several points has emerged among the commentators. The majority of scholars concede that the Framers intended to give Congress, and not the President, the power to initiate the use of the armed forces.[312] Indeed, this principle seemed self-evident among the Framers.[313] Charles Lofgren notes that the Committee on Detail “had little trouble in allocating the war-making power.”[314] “Clearly, as the committee sensed the will of the Convention on these points—points which, it must be remembered, had scarcely been debated—war making fell almost automatically to Congress.”[315]
The ratifying conventions also interpreted the war powers of Congress broadly.[316] Reveley concluded that “the Ratifiers generally equated Congress’ power to declare war under the Constitution with its power to determine on war under the Articles of Confederation.”[317] Robert Livingston stated that the powers of the Confederation Congress and the new Congress were “the very same . . . [including] the power of making war.”[318]
James Wilson argued that the new Constitution would not “hurry us into war . . . [because] the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representative.”[319] Like the Philadelphia convention, the ratifying conventions engaged in little debate over the declaration of war clause.[320] This “modest inattention . . . appears to have stemmed from the unanimous expectation that it left the President no independent war-making authority.”[321] Only Pierce Butler, at the South Carolina Convention, spoke on the declaration clause issue.[322] Butler recounted for the delegates his recollections of the debate surrounding the substitution of “declare” for “make.”[323] He said the Convention at first proposed:
[T]o vest the sole power of making peace or war in the Senate; but this was objected to as inimical to the genius of a republic, by destroying the necessary balance they were anxious to preserve. Some gentlemen were inclined to give this power to the President; but it was objected to as throwing into his hands the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity of involving his country in a war whenever he wished to promote her destruction. The House of Representatives was then named; but an insurmountable objection was made to this proposition—which was, that negotiations always required the greatest secrecy, which could not be expected in a large body.[324]
In the Federalist No. 41, Madison seems to argue that the power to declare war is inherent.[325] He listed the declaration clause as a power to provide “[s]ecurity against foreign danger,”[326] and then added: “Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form.”[327]
Madison was most concerned about quelling state fears of a centralized war power.[328] He saw the necessity of placing the power with the federal government: “Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.”[329]
Thus the power to declare war, to raise armies, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to regulate and call out the militia, and to tax are necessary concomitants of the Union’s “impulse of self-preservation.”[330] The Constitution attempted to limit military establishments without impairing their effectiveness.[331] With these safeguards, Madison argued for the absolute necessity of broad war powers.[332]
Madison’s comments ignored the distribution of power between the Congress and the Executive.[333] Like others, he seemed to think that the Constitution left the Congress with the power to make war.[334]
The breadth of congressional war making powers was also suggested by the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal.[335] These were species of private warfare in which governments would grant authority to private individuals to carry out hostilities.[336] Although the Confederation Congress possessed the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, their use for the peacetime satisfaction of the private claims had fallen into disuse.[337] It could be argued that the inclusion of this power was careless oversight in that the practice was obsolete by the time of the Convention.[338]
Professor Lofgren, however, rejects that interpretation.[339] He believed that the clause “could easily have been interpreted [by its authors and their contemporaries] . . . as a kind of shorthand for vesting in Congress the power of general reprisal outside the context of declared war.”[340] Although this interpretation is not without doubt, it comports with the late eighteenth century understanding of perfect and imperfect wars.[341] Declared wars were “perfect” while undeclared wars were “imperfect.”[342] Imperfect wars occurred “where a certain violent protection of our rights is necessary,” with the violence consisting of state-authorized private reprisals directed at property held by the subjects of another nation.[343] Imperfect wars could lead to perfect wars.[344]
Lofgren concluded that the power over marque and reprisals would have given increased plausibility to the view that Congress possessed whatever war-commencing power was not covered by the phrase “to declare war.”[345] Thus, a late eighteenth century American could reasonably believe “that the Constitution vested Congress with control over the commencement of war, whether declared or undeclared.”[346]
While granting Congress broad powers, the Framers made a sharp distinction between the power to commence war and the power to conduct it once begun.[347] Whereas Congress was given the power to put the country into a state of war, once it did so, the responsibility of conducting the war fell to the President.[348] Thus, from the beginning, the Convention agreed that the President would be the Commander in Chief.[349] Like the declaration clause, the Commander in Chief Clause received little attention.[350] Most of the state constitutions in effect at that time created a similar power in the state governor.[351] There was distrust for unchecked executive authority. As Professors Barron and Lederman noted:
[N]ot a single one of the new state constitutions expressly conferred such preclusive authority, nor did any of them suggest that the legislative branch would be prevented from interfering with the Commander in Chief’s conduct of military operations. Moreover, five of them—including the Massachusetts Constitution, which likely was the primary model for the federal Commander in Chief Clause in 1787—stated expressly that the governor would have to exercise his military powers in conformity with state law[352]
The Convention’s first proposal on this subject, the New Jersey Plan, specifically prohibited the Executive to “take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct any enterprise as General . . . .”[353] Hamilton’s plan authorized the executive to “have the direction of the war when authorized or begun.”[354] Earlier, Pierce Butler and Eldridge Gerry supported a single executive because of the efficiency he would have in directing combat.[355] Butler said that his support for a single executive was forged by “seeing the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland when threatened with invasion”; while Gerry thought it would be “extremely inconvenient” to have multiple executives, “particularly in military matters . . . It would be a general with three heads.”[356]
From these few references, the Convention adopted the brief Commander in Chief power without discussion.[357] The phrase first appeared on May 25.[358] The notion that the President would have the power to conduct a war was not unimportant to some. For example, Rufus King’s explanation that the insertion of “declare” for “make” did not take away the Executive function to conduct a war prompted at least one state to change its vote, and if Jackson’s journal is correct, may have reversed a vote against the change.[359]
Once the concerns about the Executive on horseback and the ubiquitous fears of central government were satisfied, the Commander in Chief Clause was not controversial.[360] Perhaps, “the [C]ommander in [C]hief [C]lause was noncontroversial because the Framers intended it to convey tightly circumscribed authority.”[361] The Ratifiers viewed the Commander in Chief power as the narrow power to conduct the nation’s military operations.[362]
Nevertheless, this carried a great power and potential for abuse. This made the Commander in Chief a matter in some ratifying conventions.[363] Some Ratifiers expressed the fear that an unscrupulous president may become like a king in that he would use the army to ensure punishment.[364] Nevertheless, the Conventions were persuaded that the Commander in Chief power would be a limited one.[365]
The best description of this power came from Hamilton in the Federalist.[366] Hamilton’s argument was practical—a single voice was needed to carry out a war: “[T]he direction of a war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”[367]
Hamilton’s more general comments on the advantage of a single Executive reveal the practical nature of his argument.[368] For example, in the Federalist, No. 70, Hamilton extolled the energy of a single Executive saying:
“That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and [dispatch] will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater, number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.”[369] Moreover, multiple executives increase the possibility of disagreement among themselves and the people, and “tend[] to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.”[370]
Hamilton described the substantial power of the Commander in Chief Clause in comparison to the English Crown.[371] Where the King of Great Britain had command of his armies “at all times,” the President could have only “occasional command” of the armed forces as were called into actual service of the Union.[372] He described the Commander in Chief power as much inferior to the King’s:
[N]othing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British King extends to the [declaring] of war and to the [raising] and [regulating] of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.[373]
Hamilton thought that the President’s power was not even as great as that of some state governors.[374] Edward Corwin interpreted Hamilton to mean that, in war, the President would be:
[T]op general and top admiral of the forces provided by Congress, so that no one can be put over him or be authorized to give him orders in the direction of the said forces; but otherwise he will have no powers that any high military or naval commander not also President might not have.[375]
The result was a Constitution that split the war commencing and war conducting powers.[376] Professor Van Alstyne summarized the result of vesting the war commencing power in Congress and the war-conducting power in the President.[377]
If it is the case that the Congress has made a suitable determination to authorize the use of armed force to effectuate national policy in any given instance, then discretion concerning affiliated logistical, tactical, and strategic decisions properly reposes with the presidency, consistent always, however, with the scope of the antecedent congressional declaration.[378]
To paraphrase Van Alstyne, the Constitution allows the Congress to authorize the President to conduct a war. In turn, the Constitution restricts the President to the war authorized by Congress.[379]
The question remains about the scope of any emergency presidential power prior to any congressional declaration of war.[380] Madison and Gerry’s motion to substitute “declare” for “make” carried with it the coda “leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.”[381] The delegates apparently accepted this notion as self-evident. No debate was recorded on this issue. The absence of debate does not help to delimit the power. Although mentioned by Madison in his motion and not debated, the Framers did not include language to that effect in the text of the Constitution.[382] The Framers constitutionalized some aspects of emergency powers. In Article I, Section 8, Clause 15, Congress is given the power to call out “the Militia . . . to suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”[383] Once “called into the actual [s]ervice of the United States,” the President is the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”[384] Finally, the Constitution forbid states to “engage in [w]ar, unless actually invaded, or in such prominent [d]anger as will not admit of delay.”[385]
These references suggest several principles. Congress and the States were expected to respond to sudden emergency: Congress by calling out the militia, and the States when faced with a threat that required immediate action.[386] Although the President is not mentioned, the thrust of debate on August 16, 1787, showed that the Framers intended to lodge some emergency power in the President.[387] The extent of this power is not clear, however.
Raoul Berger interprets Madison’s motion literally.[388] The President has emergency power only to respond to an actual invasion.[389] “Viewed against repudiation of royal prerogative, no more can be distilled from the Madison–Gerry remark than a limited grant to the President of power to repel attack when, as the very terms ‘sudden attack’ imply, there could be no time to consult with Congress.”[390]
Berger sees a connection between the Framers’ limitation of the presidential power and nuclear warfare.[391]
We are apt to think that devastating surprise is peculiar to our times, forgetting that the Founders had lived through surprise massacres in frontier forts and settlements and well knew such havoc. It was that experience which led them to leave imminent danger of Indian attacks to the individual threatened state.[392]
Professor Ratner, although ultimately reaching a different conclusion, agrees with Berger that “[i]n 1787, ‘repel sudden attack’ probably meant ‘resist invasion or rebellion.’”[393]
Even the means by which a President may resist sudden attack may be limited.[394] Professor Lofgren noted the Framers’ apparent familiarity with the nineteenth century concept of perfect and imperfect warfare.[395] Perfect war was formally declared and engaged in by nation states while imperfect war was not declared but “where a certain violent protection of . . . rights is necessary.”[396] This violence would be carried out by state authorized reprisals against the property of another nation.[397] Contemporary writers noted the link between reprisals and imperfect war.[398] Lofgren concludes that the inclusion of the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal was not superfluous but rather was intended to give Congress the power over the commencement of war either declared or undeclared.[399]
If so, then the President’s constitutional emergency powers in time of sudden attack would be limited to defensive measures. That is, he or she could defend against the attack but could not go further and perform reprisals, i.e., acts of war. In other words, any defensive response must be proportionate to the threat. Any decision to commence war, either declared or undeclared, must be taken by Congress. Once taken, the President, as Commander in Chief, must carry out the war as declared by Congress.[400]
This study of the historical record suggests several principles that apply to the contemporary use of nuclear weapons: First, the President has no authority to initiate or prosecute aggressive war.[401] Second, the President has authority to use force to defend the country against attack.[402] Third, the President may not expand the action beyond its defensive nature.[403] Fourth, Congress may authorize the President to fight aggressive war and to use any weapons at his disposal.[404] Fifth, Congress may restrict the President’s conduct of the war.[405]
Little in the historical record suggests that the President has any power, inherent, textual, or otherwise, to initiate war.[406] The Framers’ fear of centralized power, their recent colonial experience, and the distribution of power among the three branches all point to congressional control over the decision to go to war.[407] Louis Fisher concludes that there was little doubt about the limited scope of the President’s war power. The duty to repel sudden attacks represents an emergency measure that permits the president to take actions necessary to resist sudden attacks either against the mainland of the United States or against American troops abroad. The President never received a general power to deploy troops “whenever and wherever he thought best, and the Framers did not authorize him to take the country into full-scale war or to mount an offensive attack against another nation.”[408]
On the other hand, the record is clear that the Framers intended the President to perform the practical function of guarding the nation against attack.[409] A multiple member Congress should be entrusted with the decision to go to war,[410] but it would be impossible for that same Congress to convene in time to authorize a defense against a sudden attack.[411] Nevertheless, the declaration of war is exclusive to Congress, while the war fighting responsibility is shared by the President and Congress.[412] Therefore, although the President may meet a sudden attack, the President must seek congressional approval to go beyond defense.[413]
There is no constitutional limitation on the prosecution of an aggressive war, however. The Constitution sets out a procedure to follow in order to commit the nation to war.[414] It does not set any limitations on what kind of war Congress may authorize.[415]
Congressional supremacy also extends to the conduct of the war.[416] A declared war is a perfect war but the implicit recognition of an imperfect
war in the Constitution suggests the Framers wanted Congress to have the first, ultimate, and on-going say on the question of war.[417] The Commander in Chief Clause is given consent by congressional authorization to make war.[418] It was not meant to be the President’s separate reservoir of war powers.[419]
Professor Burns Weston has proposed a contextual analysis of the legality of nuclear weapons under international law.[420] The problems faced in that forum are similar to those faced when discussing nuclear weapons legality under the Constitution. Weston responds to the contention that the continued existence of the weapons themselves is an argument for their legality.[421] In addition, no international treaty clearly outlaws nuclear weapons and further there is confusion over the source of any implied authority to promulgate a general prohibition.[422]
Weston shows that such thinking is influenced by the assumptions it makes about the world and the international legal system.[423] Such assumptions, based on a statist and centrist notion of world affairs, are out of place in a world threatened by Nuclear Armageddon.[424]
Because the absence of any treaty, prohibition makes it impossible to assess the legality vel non of nuclear weapons, Weston analyzes the legality of these weapons in the contexts in which they are likely to be used.[425] He applies the rules he derives to each context.[426]
This approach and Weston’s justification of it have clear analogues in constitutional law. The lack of any explicit constitutional condemnation of weapons of mass destruction and the continued acceptance of our nuclear arsenal by Congress serve only to establish the proposition that nuclear weapons are not per se unconstitutional. Instead, the Constitution’s structural and procedural provisions appear to require that a pragmatic judgment be made on these weapons in the contexts in which they will actually be used.[427]
Weston posits only defensive scenarios.[428] He concludes that any number of international treaties and practices outlaw the offensive use of nuclear weapons.[429] Moreover, all the nations which possess these weapons admit to
intending only defensive use.[430] This cannot apply to a constitutional analysis, however. As we have seen above, Congress can authorize an aggressive war.[431] Such authorization would supersede any treaties to the contrary for constitutional purposes.[432]
Nevertheless, the answer is straightforward: Any offensive action, conventional or nuclear, must have prior congressional approval. Congress may choose to authorize perfect war, through a declaration, or imperfect war, through congressional resolution.[433] The Constitution would not stand in the way of aggressive war. Any obstacles to aggressive war would be political and not legal.[434]
Weston posits two general contexts with specific sub-contexts within each. The general categories are: First-strike (initiating or preemptive) defensive uses; and Second Strike (retaliatory) defensive uses. Nuclear weapons can be used in each context in the following ways: (1) Strategic nuclear warfare, which includes counter-value (societal) targeting and counterforce (military) targeting; and (2) Tactical nuclear warfare, which comprises theater (intermediate) targeting and battlefield (limited) targeting.[435]
In this scenario, the President would order a nuclear strike on the opponent’s cities with strategic weapons in response to a perceived threat of attack on the United States. In theory, a preemptive, counter-value strike is designed to deter the opponent from attacking by inflicting enormous damage on its society. It is likely, however, to invite the opponent to respond in kind. A nuclear opponent whose cities have been decimated by large-scale nuclear weapons has little to lose by launching a retaliatory attack on the United States.[436] It seems disingenuous to describe first strike, counter-value targeting as defensive. Nevertheless, the constitutional question concerns the President’s ability to respond to a threat of attack.
It is undisputed that the President can respond defensively to an attack.[437] The issue here, however, is the nature of the response and the imminence of the attack. As our historical study points out, the Framers were familiar with surprise attacks.[438] The notion, self-evident to them, that the President could respond seems limited to “imminent” attacks, however.[439] These would be attacks where there would be no opportunity to convene Congress for consultation or to ask for a declaration. It is for this reason that Raoul Berger confines imminent to the case of missiles actually falling on the United States.[440] As a first principle, then, counter-value targeting must wait until the nuclear attack is imminent; that is, at least until the opponent’s missiles are in the air.[441]
A second principle, however, further supports the conclusion against a first strike against counter-value targets. Our historical study shows that the President may not expand the military action beyond its defensive scope.[442] This implies a proportionality principle.[443] That is, the President’s defensive response must be in proportion to the attack. A first strike, however, is based on the speculation that the opponent will attack.[444] There is no way to judge proportionality in this case. Thus, to be faithful to the values enshrined in the Constitution, one must conclude that first strike, counter-value targeting must await congressional approval.[445]
The idea behind the proportionality principle is to allow Congress to convene to decide the country’s proper response.[446] A preemptive,
counter-value strike virtually assures the beginning of a retaliatory spiral, where first the opponent and then the United States respond to one another’s barrages with an attack of their own. In this situation, a first strike is just
that: the initiation of warfare. The Constitution requires congressional approval.
The second scenario to consider is a preemptive strike against so-called counterforce targets, that is, military targets. In theory, such a first strike is limited to the military installations which are capable of carrying out a nuclear attack on the United States.[447] In practice, however, such targeting would cause enormous collateral damage.[448] Such damage would assure a retaliatory strike.[449] Thus, the proportionality principle would rule out any such preemptive attack.
Tactical preemptive strikes against military targets might be different, however. In theory, these strikes would be against military targets using low-yield weapons.[450] The problem comes in applying the proportionality principle in light of the enormous power of even low yield weapons.[451] So called tactical weapons can range from small battlefield weapons only a fraction of the size of the Hiroshima weapon to bombs which rival the power of strategic weapons delivered by inter-ballistic missiles.[452] The use of one of these latter weapons against a military target could potentially cause the same kind of disproportionate collateral damage that counterforce strategic weapons cause. In either case, the first use of such weapons virtually assures an enlargement of the conflict beyond its defensive scope.[453]
The constitutionality of preemptive tactical strikes depends on the size of the weapon used. A truly low-yield weapon, the use of which does not invite strategic response, might satisfy the defensive and proportionality principles.[454] Professor Weston employs the same distinction in his analysis of the international law rules governing nuclear war.[455] He defines a tactical weapon as one below the 13 to 22 kiloton level of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapons.[456]
Using this as our baseline, the question then becomes can the first use of nuclear weapons ever be both defensive and proportionate.[457] First, the use of tactical weapons absent congressional approval to preempt a conventional attack would not be proportionate to the threat posed by the adversary.[458] Indeed, the President has the responsibility to defend the United States. In the likely situation, however, a conventional force would be arrayed against United States forces deployed in a foreign country.[459] This is a qualitatively different case from missiles falling on the United States. The President would not be defending the United States against sudden attack.[460] Rather, the situation would undoubtedly have developed over a period of time.[461] During this interim, Congress could convene to consider the extent of presidential authority.[462] Without such authority, the President must meet conventional force with conventional force.
The use of tactical weapons to preempt a tactical nuclear attack would follow the same analysis. The likely development of such a crisis over a relatively long period of time would allow Congress to debate the question.[463]
The principle of proportionate response would limit presidential authority on the second use of nuclear weapons to a tactical nuclear attack. Absent congressional approval, the President could not respond to a tactical strike with a strategic strike. Assuming a proportionate response, however, the second use of nuclear weapons would not violate the constitutional norms that animated the Framers.
The Constitution might not preclude the use of a tactical response to a conventional attack. Nothing in the historical study would prevent the President from using the weapons at his disposal to defend American troops.[464] Nevertheless, the risk that using nuclear weapons to defend against a conventional attack would expand the conflict beyond its defensive context and would outweigh the necessity for their use.[465] The guiding principle should be that in all but the most extreme circumstances Congress must authorize the initiation of conflict and its conduct.[466] There would be ample time for Congress to debate the nature and extent of presidential authority.[467]
In summary, the principles the Framers embedded in the Constitution require prior congressional authorization before the President launches a strategic preemptive strike.[468] By the same token, the same principles require congressional authorization prior to any preemptive tactical strike. On the other hand, a defensive retaliation in kind would not require constitutional approval. A retaliation out of proportion to the attack would require prior congressional authorization.
This Article focuses on the norm of prior congressional authorization.[469] A thorough analysis on how to implement that norm is beyond the scope of this Article but it will be helpful to discuss a few of the possibilities.[470] The question is “[w]hat war powers system would enhance the effectiveness of the United States in making decisions about war and peace.”[471]
Professor Raven-Hansen laid out the range of possibilities:
Nothing in the present distribution [of the war powers] would bar Congress from prohibiting first use or early first use. If time permits—as well it may today or in the near future in the European first-use scenario—the full Congress could also remove the prohibition during a conventional war. Congress cannot invade the [C]ommander in [C]hief’s prerogatives by microcommanding the armed forces, but its power to authorize limited or partial war—limited in this case to conventional war—has been judicially recognized since 1800.[472]
Working within the current constitutional structure, Congress could pass legislation involving itself in making nuclear policy.[473] It could require the
President to prepare a quadrennial Nuclear Posture Review and submit it to Congress for approval.[474] The process could be modeled on the National Emergencies Act.[475] Congress would treat the review as a special bill and be required to vote on it and submit the results to the President for signature or approval. If the President vetoed the bill, Congress could override the veto.[476] Unlike the National Emergency Act, which imposes strict and fairly short time frames for congressional action, Congress would be allowed to spend more time considering the review.[477] This approval could be joined with an on-going requirement that the President inform Congress and consult with congressional committees on possible changes to the Nuclear Posture Review.[478]
Congress could pass legislation in advance to deal with the use of nuclear weapons[479] or otherwise limit the President’s discretion to use nuclear weapons.[480] As opposed to the broad delegation of control to the President in the Atomic Energy Act,[481] Congress could pre-authorize specific uses under specific circumstances.[482] Congress also could approach the matter as the Markey-Lieu legislation does and declare that “[i]t shall be the policy of the United States that no first-use nuclear strike should be conducted absent a declaration of war by Congress.”[483]
Finally, we could amend the Constitution.[484] Perhaps nuclear weapons have rendered the Constitution’s imprecise processes obsolete and the consequences of nuclear war so severe that we have to rethink the balance of war powers.[485] Any structural changes to the war powers would require a constitutional amendment.[486] For example, Edward Corwin and the Federation of American Scientists suggested special committee approval or legislative vetoes.[487] These methods would contravene the constitutional process for making law and, thus, require a constitutional amendment.[488]
This discussion takes on an otherworldly tone after a while.[489] Some good can come about if, as Herman Kahn said, this discussion “takes the edge off the bizarreness, i.e., if it makes it easier to discuss the problem and to weigh various policies on their merits, rather than on relatively thoughtless (though often deeply held) emotional reactions.”[490] The Framers could never have anticipated mass destruction weapons like nuclear bombs.[491] We can articulate the general but indeterminate principles very well, but we have no way of knowing if the Framers would have modified these principles if they lived in the nuclear age.[492] In the end, the nuclear age may require new constitutional rules and not recourse to the old principles.[493] The only way to know, however, is to apply the old principles to the new age.[494]
The point of this Article was to explore the truth of Jefferson’s claim that the Constitution has chained “the dog of war.”[495] In an age of clipper ships and slow-moving armies without means of immediate communication, Jefferson may have been correct. One hopes the constitutional structures that could constrain eighteenth century armies will have an effect on the use of nuclear weapons.
The cardinal index of constitutionality is the Constitution itself, not what others have said about it . . . we must look at the Constitution with eyes unclouded by the opinions of others. On so great a constitutional issue, nothing less suffices than the most searching analysis of the immediately relevant text and what the Framers stated they meant to accomplish by it.
Berger, supra note 51, at 31–32. ↑