Rodriguez Cabrera v. Barr (Agee 07/19/2019): The Fourth Circuit held that Virginia’s statute prohibiting participation in criminal gang activity does not categorically qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court granted the petition for review, vacated the immigration judge’s order of removal, and remanded with instructions to terminate the removal proceedings. Full Opinion
Taylor v. Grubbs (Motz 7/18/2019): The Fourth Circuit held that an indigent prisoner may proceed in forma pauperis on appeal from an order assigning his third strike. The Court reaffirmed that the district court’s dismissal of the prisoner’s complaint does not, in an appeal of that dismissal, qualify as a “prior” dismissal and granted the prisoner’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis. Full Opinion
U.S. v. Cortez (Harris 7/17/2019): The Fourth Circuit held that it is the regulatory definition of a “notice to appear”—not the definition at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)—that controls whether the government properly initiated an immigration proceeding under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a). The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. Full Opinion
Manning v. Caldwell (Motz and Keenan 7/16/2019): The Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia statutory scheme that makes it a criminal offense for those whom the Commonwealth has labelled “habitual drunkards” to possess, consume, or purchase alcohol is unconstitutionally vague, and that even assuming it could be limited to those suffering from alcoholism, the plaintiffs stated an Eighth Amendment claim under both Robinson and Powell.The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Full Opinion
Graves v. Lioi (Agee 7/16/2019): The Fourth Circuit held that the evidence was not sufficient to allow a verdictin the appellant’s favor and, in the alternative, the officers were entitled to qualified andpublic official immunity.The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. Full Opinion
Retfalvi v. U.S.(Hollander 7/16/2019): The Fourth Circuit held that the IRS can use its domestic assessment authority in pursuit of the collection of a liability owed by a taxpayer to Canada. The Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.Full Opinion
Turner v. Thomas,
Decided: July 19, 2019
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that the facts alleged in the appellant’s complaint did not amount to a violation of clearly established law where police officers at a rally were instructed not to intervene in violence among protesters. The Court reasoned that at the time of the Charlottesville rally, there existed no legal authority giving the appellees fair warning that ordering officers not to intervene in violence among protesters would implicate the state-created danger doctrine and amount to a violation of protesters’ due process rights.
Appellant Robert Sanchez Turner was attacked by protesters at the “Unite the Right” rally on August 12, 2017 in Charlottesville, Virginia. Turner claimed that, pursuant to a stand-down order under which police officers at the rally were instructed not to intervene in violence among protesters, officers watched his attack and did nothing to help. Turner brought suit against Al Thomas Jr., former Chief of the Charlottesville Police Department; W. Stephen Flaherty, Virginia State Police Superintendent; and the City of Charlottesville, hereinafter known as “the appellees.” The district court concluded that the appellees were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed Turner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that the facts alleged in Turner’s complaint did not amount to a violation of clearly established law.
In its opinion, the Court reasoned the appellant put forth no facts suggesting that a stand-down order crosses the line from inaction to action when the state conduct in existing precedent, Pinderand Doe, did not. Acting under Pinder’s teaching that state actors may not be held liable for “st[anding] by and d[oing] nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them,” the appellees could have reasonably concluded that a stand-down order violated no constitutional right. Accordingly, the appellant did not allege a violation of clearly established law, and the appellees were entitled to qualified immunity. Because there was no clearly established law imposing liability based on deliberate indifference in this context, qualified immunity shielded the appellees from such liability.
Miranda B. Nelson